SNL Parody: Netflix Originals

Check out this funny Saturday Night Live parody video, which takes aim at Netflix's strategy for creating tons of original content.  It's a great way to start Monday morning!

Can Spotify Grow Its Way to Profitability?

Shira Ovide has written a good column for Bloomberg BusinessWeek regarding Spotify's IPO. In the article, she highlights a crucial difference between the Netflix and Spotify business models. It's a distinction that I've discussed in depth with my students.   It's a wonderful lesson in marginal vs. fixed costs.   Here's an excerpt from Ovide's column:

However much Spotify resembles Netflix in spirit and business approach, the services diverge in a way that makes Spotify’s path to profit significantly trickier. The video streaming company’s programming expenses don’t rise as it lures more subscribers. But as Spotify gets bigger, its streaming music costs increase; it can’t grow its way to profitability. Spotify’s product—35 million songs—costs the company more as more people sign up. 

Ovide does acknowledge that some costs will fall as Spotify continues to grow.  As the company gains more clout, it can negotiate better royalty deals with content providers.  Still, growth alone will not drive strong profits.  Marginal costs will remain positive, unlike Netflix.   Ovide argues that Spotify will have to diversify its revenue streams, as it has begun to do and as its chief financial officer discussed recently.  Ovide raises one other possibility, but she dismisses it as unlikely - that is, could Spotify develop its own content, as Netflix has done.  In other words, could it sign up musicians directly, disintermediating the record labels.  That's a highly risky strategy that could undermine the entire business though.   

The future will be fascinating to watch.  As a Spotify customer, I enjoy the service a great deal.  They clearly have lowered the cost for me to listen to the music that I love.   Will advertisting be a key revenue stream moving forward?  In the past, that has been the path to profitabilty for a number of companies.  Yet the Facebook crisis suggests that people are growing a bit more concerned about what a reliance on advertising can do to online platforms.  The Facebook mess should cause Spotify to tread carefully as it tries to drive new revenue through advertising.  The challenge will be to develop this revenue stream in a responsible manner, and in a way that does not scare off customers who are now waking up to the downside of "free" online platforms.  

What's the "Optimal" Failure Rate at Netflix?

When Orange is the New Black, House of Cards, and Crown became mega-hits for Netflix, many people credited the analytics capabilities of the company. Mining the customer data had enabled the firm to project the type of original programming that would be highly successful. By this logic, Netflix would achieve a lower failure rate on new shows than the major television networks. After all, broadcasters such as CBS and NBC cancel a substantial share of their new shows each year, some after only a few episodes. 

On the recent Netflix earnings call, many investors were pleased to hear about strong subscriber growth at the firm. However, some investors came away concerned about the amount of spending taking place as the firm acquires or develops new content. Moreover, some observers and analysts have expressed concern about the recent cancellations of some new Netflix original shows. Tom Huddleston Jr. reported on the company's reaction to this criticism in a recent Fortune article:

Meanwhile, also on the Monday earnings call, Netflix's chief content officer Ted Sarandos defended the company's recent cancellations of a handful of expensive, but underperforming, original series. "The more shows we have, the more likely in absolute numbers that you’ll see cancellations, of course," Sarandos said. The executive compared Netflix's recent spate of cancellations—including big-budget series like The Get Down and Sense8—to traditional TV networks that cancel nearly one-third of their new shows after their first seasons. Netflix, he said, has renewed 93% of its original series. With respect to the shows that Netflix opted not to renew, Sarandos argued: "If you’re not failing, maybe you’re not trying hard enough."

This quote from Sarandos raises a fascinating question.  What is the "optimal" failure rate at Netflix?  Surely, we would like the failure rate to be lower than the broadcast networks.  We would like to see the company reaping the benefits of its analytics capabilities.  At the same time, no one should want Netflix's failure rate on original programming to be zero.  We want the firm to take some chances in hopes of landing some surprising breakthrough hits.  Hopefully, the firm isn't simply guessing or drawing on the intuition of the "creatives" in the business.  We would like to see them engaging in "enlightened" experimentation, using big data to guide them while still taking some risks.   If they balance data mining and risk-taking in an effective way, the failure rate won't be zero, but it will be much lower than their broadcast and cable competitors.  

Netflix: Geography, Age, Gender Not Good Predictors

David Morris wrote an article this week for Fortune titled, "Netflix: Geography, Age, and Gender are 'Garbage' for Predicting Taste." Morris writes, 

"'Geography, age, and gender? We put that in the garbage heap,' VP of product Todd Yellin said. Instead, viewers are grouped into “clusters” almost exclusively by common taste, and their Netflix homepages highlight the relatively small slice of content that matches their taste profile. Those profiles could be the same for someone in New Orleans as someone in New Delhi (though they would likely have access to very different libraries)."

Why is this statement so fascinating?  To me, it speaks directly to Netflix's competitive advantage.  If geography, age, and gender were, in fact, accurate predictors of viewers' preferences, then Netflix would have a far less formidable advantage over rivals.  Why?  Well, those variables are easy to identify and measure.  Others can get access to that data quite easily and build predictive algorithms using that information.  However, if more accurate predictive algorithms involve data that are not as publicly available, then Netflix has a key advantage.  In other words, if the predictive power rests with variables that come from proprietary data that Netflix has collected about us, then the sustainability of Netflix's advantage over competitors rises substantially.  The same holds true for any company trying to take advantage of "big data" to develop predictive algorithms.   The key is to unearth variables that matter, but hopefully, variables that are not easily identified and measured by others.  

Broadcast Television: How Can They Discount the Netflix Threat?

AdWeek has a startling article about one broadcast network executive's thoughts regarding Netflix. McAlone quotes Alan Wurtzel, NBC's head of research. Wurtzel draws on data from Symphony Advanced Media, which has been trying to assess Netflix viewing habits through various metrics (since Netflix does not disclose viewership on particular shows). Wurtzel says, "The reports of our death have been greatly exaggerated."  AdWeek reports that, "Symphony measured the average audience in the 18-to-49 demographic for each episode within 35 days of a new Netflix series premiere between September and December. During that time, Marvel's Jessica Jones averaged 4.8 million viewers in the demographic, comparable to the 18-to-49 ratings for How to Get Away with Murder and Modern Family." The article goes on to report the following about Wurtzel's views:

Wurtzel said Symphony's data also revealed that most viewers of those SVOD (subscription video on demand) shows return to their old viewing habits by the third week. "[By then], people are watching TV the way that God intended"—that is, via traditional, linear viewing—said Wurtzel. "The impact goes away."  That's because Netflix has "a very different business model—their business model is to make you write a check the next month," said Wurtzel. "I don't believe there's enough stuff on Netflix that is broad enough and consistent enough to affect us in a meaningful way on a consistent basis."

I'm speechless.  How could Wurtzel have his head so far buried in the sand?  Has he spent anytime actually visiting the homes of families with teenagers or interviewing college students?  Does he understand how they consume content?   Compare Wurtzel's view with the information shared in a Business Insider article by Lara O'Reilly: 

The average Netflix subscriber streams movies and programs for two hours a day, according to estimates from Rich Greenfield, an analyst at BTIG Research.  That's huge.  Not only is that mean average domestic number up around 18 minutes per subscriber per day on BTIG's last estimates, but it is a major benchmark that suggests Netflix is really eating traditional TV's dinner.

Investors vs. Competitors: Disclosing Information Involves Key Tradeoffs

Companies face important tradeoffs when thinking about how much information to disclose about their business.  Investors, of course, want a great deal of information about the nuts and bolts of a business.  They want detailed segment information for diversified firms. They would like to see more detailed operating metrics about performance that might serve as leading indicators of financial performance in upcoming quarters.  They want to understand customer satisfaction, product pipelines, etc.  Companies face a delicate balancing act though. The more they disclose to investors, the more that they are also disclosing to competitors.   For instance, many diversified firms provide frustratingly little segment information in their 10K reports.  Of course, they can get away with this limited disclosure as long as they are performing well overall.  When the numbers decline, investors begin to wonder if the whole is worth less than the sum of the parts.  To complete that analysis, investors push for more detailed information about segment performance.   The diversified company may resist such calls though, not simply because they wish to rebuff activist investors.  They also may not want to offer critical data to competitors.  

The Wall Street Journal's Heard on the Street column demonstrated this conundrum that firms face when describing the situation at Netflix these days.  Investors would like to know how many people are viewing the company's original content.  They are, after all, used to seeing ratings information for broadcast andcable networks. On the other hand, Netflix may have good reason to resist investors' push for more disclosure. In fact, investors should understand that less disclosure may be very good for the bottom line. Here's an excerpt from this week's Heard on the Street column;

As much as Netflix’s investors might also want to know that, there is an important strategic advantage for the company in keeping everyone in the dark. Not only does having all the data allow Netflix to continue to tout the success of its originals, it also means more leverage over media companies in licensing negotiations. If the companies don’t know how many people are watching their shows on Netflix, they don’t know how much to charge for it.

Netflix, Analytics, and Original Programming

Many former and current students have asked me about Netflix's decision to offer original programming.  They always want to know, "Does vertical integration make sense for Netflix or not?"  They know that vertical integration has not always worked out in entertainment industry (think the breakup of Viacom/CBS and the unfortunate consequences of the AOL-Time Warner merger).  I ran across this CNBC interview with Netflix CEO Reed Hastings today (thank you, Professor Jay Rao, for pointing me in this direction!).   Hastings commented on the company's original programming:

Hastings attributed the success of original programming such as "Orange is the New Black" and "House of Cards" to Netflix's powerful data analytics.  "We are just a learning machine. Every time we put out a new show, we are analyzing it, figuring out what worked and what didn't so we get better next time," Hastings added.

Hastings' comments suggest that vertical integration may make a great deal of sense in this case, because Netflix can increase the odds of success with its original programming due to data analytics.  How powerful can data be in this case?  Well, if think about it, Netflix has been invested in "big data" since its inception in the late 1990s (long before big data became a common term).   From the beginning, Netflix did not want to focus on new releases. It wanted to be able to offer a deep library, and then use data to recommend lesser known titles to people.  Now, it's taking that data analytics to a whole new level, by using information it has compiled for over fifteen years to develop original programming.  As we all know, the failure rate for new shows can be quite high.   If Netflix can reduce that rate, even just by a small margin, it can improve the economics of programming substantially.  

Reed Hastings: Make as Few Decisions as Possible

Netflix CEO Reed Hastings sat down for a terrific interview with Bill Snyder of Stanford's Graduate School of Business.   I found several terrific nuggets in the piece.  In the first quote, Hastings makes the point that he's given people a great deal of autonomy at Netflix.  However, with that autonomy comes responsibility.   He has high expectations.  In the second quote, he points out that the CEO does not have be the ultimate product expert.   In fact, there may be a downside to that type of situation.  I like the concept of a "distributed set of great thinkers."  Great leaders, I believe, know how to marshal the collective intellect of an organization. 

“I take pride in making as few decisions as possible, as opposed to making as many as possible,” Hastings says. One example: Netflix’s decision to produce the popular House of Cards was a huge one, but the meeting that gave the project a green light lasted just 30 minutes. Others had already laid down the groundwork and details, making it easy for Hastings to sign off. “It’s creating a sense [in your employees] that ‘If I want to make a difference, I can make a difference.’” Freedom is only one part of the Netflix culture; the other is responsibility. Netflix, says Hastings, has created a culture of high performance. “Adequate performance gets a generous severance package,” he says, adding that “we turn over a lot of people.”

 Without mentioning Apple or the late CEO Steve Jobs by name, Hastings says certain companies’ conception of the top job was very different than his view. “Some companies operate by the principle of the product genius at the top,’’ Hastings says. “There’s this whole motif that to be a great CEO you have to be a great product person. That’s intoxicating and fun, but you build in incredible amounts of dependence on yourselves. You’re much stronger building a distributed set of great thinkers,” he says.

Netflix Pokes Fun at Amazon

Disney, Marvel, and Netflix

The Wall Street Journal reported last week about a new agreement between Disney and Netflix.  According to the newspaper, 

Walt Disney and Netflix unveiled a deal for multiple original live-action series based on four of Marvel's most popular characters to be shown exclusively on Netflix's streaming-video service.Under the agreement, Marvel will develop four serialized programs—"Daredevil," "Jessica Jones," "Iron Fist" and "Luke Cage"—leading to a miniseries programming event for Netflix. Netflix has committed to a minimum of four, 13-episode series and a culminating Marvel's "The Defenders" miniseries. 

What's the logic here?   I think Disney has not only found a new outlet for its content, but it has found a creative way to experiment with new vehicles for some of its Marvel characters.  If one of the characters becomes highly popular on Netflix, it can then choose to build feature film vehicles for these characters.  Netflix then becomes a way to experiment, as well as a way to build audience in anticipation of a feature film release.  Netflix also may offer a better fit from a distribution perspective than some of Disney's own networks (such as Disney Channel or ABC Family).  For Netflix, it offers more exclusive content to attract loyal subscribers.  It seems like a win-win for both parties.  

The Netflix Culture

If you have never viewed this presentation about the Netflix culture, you are in for a treat.  Check it out by clicking here.   I would point you to a few things, in particular, that I find insightful and refreshing.  

1. "Great workplace is stunning colleagues.  Great workplace is not day-care, espresso, health benefits, sushi lunches, nice offices, or big compensation, and we only do those that are efficient at attracting stunning colleagues."  How terrific!  People love to work with other highly talented, reliable, and kind people.    They do not like free riders, jerks, and people who don't invest time needed for self-improvement.  Think about when you went to college.  What made it a good experience?   The best courses were not simply taught by a talented professor.  They were courses in which the fellow students were intelligent, curious, reliable, and hard-working.

2.  Netflix chooses to focus on rapid recovery rather than avoidance of failure.  The firm argues that, in some environments, such as health care, we want to be highly reliable, i.e. avoid failure.  However, in creative environments, we should focus instead on rapid recovery.  

3.  The explanation of the nine behaviors and skills that the firm values in its employees is different than most "competency" models developed by company human resource departments.  The Netflix behaviors and skills are much less generic.  They describe specific behaviors, and they fit together to form a consistent whole.

4.  I like the "Keeper Test" a lot.  Here it is:  "Which of my people, if they told me they were leaving in two months for a similar job at a peer company, would I fight hard to keep at Netflix?"  The document states that you should let go of those who do not meet this test.  Make room instead for someone who will have the potential to meet this test.  It's tough medicine, but it really does make you think about whether you are keeping under-performers around too long. 

Netflix & House of Cards

Last month Netflix launched a new original series called House of Cards.  The show, starring Kevin Spacey, tells the story of a Democratic Congressman named Frank Underwood.  It has received a number of favorable reviews.  What I find most interesting about the show, though, is not the plot or the acting.  It's the way in which Netflix introduced the show.  It released all 13 episodes of the show's first "season" simultaneously.   What a fascinating move!  Why?   We know that many Netflix customers engage in "binge viewing" of television series.  They will sit down and watch an entire season of a show over a weekend - all 20 plus episodes.  So, if that's the way that many customers enjoy watching TV series, why not give them an original series in the same format?  It seems fitting.

What's interesting, of course, is that none of the major television broadcast networks have chosen to launch a series in this manner.  Why not?  Why should they be beholden to the ancient once-per-week format for TV series?  If we know consumers like to watch episodes in bunches, why not roll out a series in that manner?  Broadcast networks have watched cable television and the internet erode their ratings for years.  They need to think creatively about their business model.   A move such as this one might be a good step forward. 

The Olympics Deliver a Blow to Netflix

Procera Networks reports that streaming traffic on Netflix has fallen by 25% in recent days (reported on CNN Money website here).  The company believes that the Olympics accounts for the decreased activity on Netflix.  Indeed, Netflix has admitted that the Olympics may have an adverse effect on the firm this quarter.  I'm curious as to the financial impact, as less streaming on the part of someone who still pays the monthly subscription fee doesn't have a negative impact on Netflix earnings.  On the other hand, if the Olympics slows new subscriber growth, then the company has a problem.

This report makes me wonder what other firms might be adversely affected by the Olympics.  Will Redbox take a hit as well?  What about movie purchases and rentals via iTunes?   Do people go to movie theaters less often during these two weeks?  Perhaps sporting events such as minor league baseball take an attendance hit as well.  What do my readers think?  Any thoughts on the firms that might have a nasty financial surprise this quarter due to the two-week Olympic effect?

Qwikster gone rather quickly

Netflix has abandoned its plans to separate its DVD by mail service from its streaming business.  Qwikster is dead.  The stunning twists and turns in Netflix's strategy have left most of us dizzy.  The collapse of the stock price in recent months proves that investors don't like uncertainty.  While it's ok to change strategy, investors do not want to see constant twists, turns, and reversals. 

Beyond the uncertainty, I was never quite clear regarding the notion that Netflix and Qwikster would not share information regarding a customer's queue, movie preferences, recommendations, and rental history.  That lack of sharing made me wonder whether Netflix was failing to capitalize on one of its greatest strengths, namely its powerful predictive algorithms that it uses to recommend movies.  Would lack of sharing across sites mean that it would not capitalize on the wealth of data that it had accumulated?   It wasn't clear based on what I had read.  To me, the predictive algorithms lie at the heart of Netflix's success, and no change in strategy should undermine that strength.   After all, the algorithms enabled Netflix to take advantage of the "Long Tail Effect" - the idea that a large percentage of Netflix rentals always came from movies that were not new releases.   That strategy proved very profitable over the years.
 

SNL Parody - Netflix

Netflix and Qwikster: What are they thinking?

Why did Netflix decide to split itself in half?  Why create a new brand called Qwikster?  Most people have criticized the move quite heavily.  Slate has an interesting article about the decision.  Farhad Manjoo writes that Netflix seems to have taken guidance from Clay Christensen's model of disruptive innovation.  Manjoo bashes the move in the first few paragraphs of the article, but then writes the following:


I think it's an idiotic strategy.... And yet: It could work. In The Innovator's Dilemma, Christensen argues that the companies that are most vulnerable to disruptive technologies are those that have really good management. The problem with good managers is that they tend to listen to customers. And the problem with customers is that they don't always know what's best for them. If you were a devoted Blockbuster customer in 2001, and if Blockbuster's CEO sent you an email announcing he was closing all the company's stores and switching to a DVD-by-mail service, you would have balked... As Christensen explains, disruptive technologies usually start out as inferior substitutes, proving attractive only to a small fringe of customers. For years, the people who ran Blockbuster saw Netflix as irrelevant. It's easy to call them stupid now, but at the time they were mostly right. Blockbuster's customers considered Blockbuster better than all the alternatives; if they didn't, they wouldn't have been Blockbuster customers. And Blockbuster's managers were doing what good managers do—they were investing in the parts of the business that customers liked (opening more stores) rather than coming up with a whole new business that might alienate their current users.  The key advantage of Netflix's new model is that it will give each side of the business—the DVD side and the streaming side—flexibility to manage its service in a way that pleases its own customers. As a combined service, any move to strengthen one side of the company over the other would have been perceived negatively by one group of customers. 

For me, the negative reaction to the move has more to do with the seeming inconsistency of management's actions than anything else.  Several months ago, Netflix championed an integrated service at a low price.  Then, they raised prices dramatically on the integrated service, but allowed customers to opt for a lower priced streaming-only service.  Then, after a short period of time, they announced a split into two brands, one for streaming and one for DVD-by-email.  The series of changes in strategy over a short period of time give the impression of a management team unsure of how to move forward.  That makes investors uneasy (rightfully).  Secondly, people have criticized the move because they don't necessarily see the connection between setting up a separate business unit and establishing a second brand.  In Christensen's writings, he provides several good examples of companies establishing independent units to pursue an innovation, without necessarily creating a new brand. Take IBM's creation of a unit to launch the personal computer; it existed independent of the mainframe business, but it leveraged the existing IBM brand.

Despite all the questions, I understand Netflix's predicament.  They face unchartered waters, as a young growing company facing the inevitable demise of the original business.  In the old days, companies may have experienced the disruption of their core business after decades of success.  For Netflix, that demise of the core may be occurring just a decade after the firm rose to prominence.     

NetFlix: Value-Based Pricing Run Amok?

As everyone knows by now, NetFlix spurred a major consumer backlash with its significant pricing increase.  As I considered how they might have arrived at this decision, I began to focus on how NetFlix management might have analyzed the value that they provide for consumers.   In value-based pricing, companies examine the customer's economics, and they evaluate the cost to the consumer of purchasing an alternative.   How would this work for NetFlix?   Management would examine the customer's options, and they would calculate how much consumers would have to spend to purchase a service roughly equivalent to the one that NetFlix is offering.  If NetFlix executives examined it this way, then you can see why they might have arrived at a decision to raise price significantly.

Some have argued persuasively that they don't see a customer-friendly alternative to NetFlix at the $10 per month price point, with access to new releases and a more extensive library of older movies (which NetFlix provides through a combination of DVDs and streaming).  Thus, I can see how the decision was made.  It doesn't mean that it was a smart move.  They clearly created quite a backlash.  Moreover, as Nilofer Merchant wrote yesterday, they might have communicated and executed a price increase in a way that did not set off such a furor.

What will most interesting, though, will be to see what customers do, not what they say on social media.  How many will actually follow through on the threat to abandon NetFlix, and where will they turn.  NetFlix seems to be betting that the consumer's options aren't all that attractive, and many will end up sticking with the company despite all the complaining.  We shall see.