Netflix has abandoned its plans to separate its DVD by mail service from its streaming business. Qwikster is dead. The stunning twists and turns in Netflix's strategy have left most of us dizzy. The collapse of the stock price in recent months proves that investors don't like uncertainty. While it's ok to change strategy, investors do not want to see constant twists, turns, and reversals.
Beyond the uncertainty, I was never quite clear regarding the notion that Netflix and Qwikster would not share information regarding a customer's queue, movie preferences, recommendations, and rental history. That lack of sharing made me wonder whether Netflix was failing to capitalize on one of its greatest strengths, namely its powerful predictive algorithms that it uses to recommend movies. Would lack of sharing across sites mean that it would not capitalize on the wealth of data that it had accumulated? It wasn't clear based on what I had read. To me, the predictive algorithms lie at the heart of Netflix's success, and no change in strategy should undermine that strength. After all, the algorithms enabled Netflix to take advantage of the "Long Tail Effect" - the idea that a large percentage of Netflix rentals always came from movies that were not new releases. That strategy proved very profitable over the years.
Showing posts with label Qwikster. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Qwikster. Show all posts
Monday, October 10, 2011
Tuesday, October 04, 2011
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
Netflix and Qwikster: What are they thinking?
Why did Netflix decide to split itself in half? Why create a new brand called Qwikster? Most people have criticized the move quite heavily. Slate has an interesting article about the decision.
I think it's an idiotic strategy.... And yet: It could work. In The Innovator's Dilemma, Christensen argues that the companies that are most vulnerable to disruptive technologies are those that have really good management. The problem with good managers is that they tend to listen to customers. And the problem with customers is that they don't always know what's best for them. If you were a devoted Blockbuster customer in 2001, and if Blockbuster's CEO sent you an email announcing he was closing all the company's stores and switching to a DVD-by-mail service, you would have balked... As Christensen explains, disruptive technologies usually start out as inferior substitutes, proving attractive only to a small fringe of customers. For years, the people who ran Blockbuster saw Netflix as irrelevant. It's easy to call them stupid now, but at the time they were mostly right. Blockbuster's customers considered Blockbuster better than all the alternatives; if they didn't, they wouldn't have been Blockbuster customers. And Blockbuster's managers were doing what good managers do—they were investing in the parts of the business that customers liked (opening more stores) rather than coming up with a whole new business that might alienate their current users. The key advantage of Netflix's new model is that it will give each side of the business—the DVD side and the streaming side—flexibility to manage its service in a way that pleases its own customers. As a combined service, any move to strengthen one side of the company over the other would have been perceived negatively by one group of customers.
For me, the negative reaction to the move has more to do with the seeming inconsistency of management's actions than anything else. Several months ago, Netflix championed an integrated service at a low price. Then, they raised prices dramatically on the integrated service, but allowed customers to opt for a lower priced streaming-only service. Then, after a short period of time, they announced a split into two brands, one for streaming and one for DVD-by-email. The series of changes in strategy over a short period of time give the impression of a management team unsure of how to move forward. That makes investors uneasy (rightfully). Secondly, people have criticized the move because they don't necessarily see the connection between setting up a separate business unit and establishing a second brand. In Christensen's writings, he provides several good examples of companies establishing independent units to pursue an innovation, without necessarily creating a new brand. Take IBM's creation of a unit to launch the personal computer; it existed independent of the mainframe business, but it leveraged the existing IBM brand.
Despite all the questions, I understand Netflix's predicament. They face unchartered waters, as a young growing company facing the inevitable demise of the original business. In the old days, companies may have experienced the disruption of their core business after decades of success. For Netflix, that demise of the core may be occurring just a decade after the firm rose to prominence.
I think it's an idiotic strategy.... And yet: It could work. In The Innovator's Dilemma, Christensen argues that the companies that are most vulnerable to disruptive technologies are those that have really good management. The problem with good managers is that they tend to listen to customers. And the problem with customers is that they don't always know what's best for them. If you were a devoted Blockbuster customer in 2001, and if Blockbuster's CEO sent you an email announcing he was closing all the company's stores and switching to a DVD-by-mail service, you would have balked... As Christensen explains, disruptive technologies usually start out as inferior substitutes, proving attractive only to a small fringe of customers. For years, the people who ran Blockbuster saw Netflix as irrelevant. It's easy to call them stupid now, but at the time they were mostly right. Blockbuster's customers considered Blockbuster better than all the alternatives; if they didn't, they wouldn't have been Blockbuster customers. And Blockbuster's managers were doing what good managers do—they were investing in the parts of the business that customers liked (opening more stores) rather than coming up with a whole new business that might alienate their current users. The key advantage of Netflix's new model is that it will give each side of the business—the DVD side and the streaming side—flexibility to manage its service in a way that pleases its own customers. As a combined service, any move to strengthen one side of the company over the other would have been perceived negatively by one group of customers.
For me, the negative reaction to the move has more to do with the seeming inconsistency of management's actions than anything else. Several months ago, Netflix championed an integrated service at a low price. Then, they raised prices dramatically on the integrated service, but allowed customers to opt for a lower priced streaming-only service. Then, after a short period of time, they announced a split into two brands, one for streaming and one for DVD-by-email. The series of changes in strategy over a short period of time give the impression of a management team unsure of how to move forward. That makes investors uneasy (rightfully). Secondly, people have criticized the move because they don't necessarily see the connection between setting up a separate business unit and establishing a second brand. In Christensen's writings, he provides several good examples of companies establishing independent units to pursue an innovation, without necessarily creating a new brand. Take IBM's creation of a unit to launch the personal computer; it existed independent of the mainframe business, but it leveraged the existing IBM brand.
Despite all the questions, I understand Netflix's predicament. They face unchartered waters, as a young growing company facing the inevitable demise of the original business. In the old days, companies may have experienced the disruption of their core business after decades of success. For Netflix, that demise of the core may be occurring just a decade after the firm rose to prominence.
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